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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Respondent agrees with the statements of the Appellant concerning
the nature of the case, except those statements contained in the third
paragraph. At not time did the Appellant plead [see Rule 8(c), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure] as an "affinnative defense" the lack of the license
by the Respondent.

DISPOSITION BELOW
The Respondent agrees with the statements of the Appellant concerning
the disposition below. The Respondent contends that this appeal can only
concern the ruling and judgment entered by Judge Gould. The denial of
Appellant's Motion to Dismiss, heard by Judge Cornaby on Febuary 2, 1982,
is not involved in this appeal because the denial of the motion to dismiss
is_ not a _ftnal_ order_ _from_whiciL arL appeal may_lie_ [Rule 72( a}, Utah Rules

of Civil Procedure] and because the Appellant. did not file a notice of
appeal concerning that ruling within the time period required by law.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondent agrees with the.statements of the Appellant concerning
the facts as shown by the testimony in the trial court below. However, the
Respondent believes that such testimony also showed additional pertinent
facts.
The parties contracted among themselves to have the Respondent install
improvements (curb and gutter, sidewalks, water and sewer lines, and street
paving) within a subdivision located in Fannington, Utah. It was the
contemplation of all the parties to the contract that the improvements
would be done to specifications stipulated by Fannington City. [Transcript,
p. 9] The testimony further indicated that the actual execution of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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was delayed while the Appellants were waiting for final approval of the
construction drawings and other plans by Fannington City. [Transcript, p.
10] The reason for such control by the City is that these improvements are
intended to become the property of the City upon completion of the subdivision
and accordingly, the City should have some say in how they are installed.
[See Transcript, p. 17]. Thus, Fannington City was going to inspect the
installation of the improvements by the Respondent. Of these inspections,
the testimony indicated:
Mr. George:
We are controlled, our quality of work is controlled
Bl the Fannington City inspector, our project engineer, who designs
the job doesn't inspect it. All of fill work~ inspected Bl
Farmington City, or wherever we are at. They inspect it. We test
it. I have to pay for---in the case of the sanitary sewer, it
has to be air tested. It has to be pumped with air and hold, hold
air, so that you can't get water infiltrating into the sewer, or
out of it • .!! has to meet these standards and conform to_the city
standards. I have another man who is a specialist. It seems like
we are all specialists now days. He has the equipment to---the
big compressors, to come and pump up the line and make the
determination. If it doesn't hold air, if it doesn't pass, he
tells Farmington City. Fannington City then, or anybody else,
withholds approval from accepting the job until such time as
~make these_repairs. The man comes back, retests it, and then
tells the city or the owners that yes, this has passed. And it
is in compliance with all the city standards.
11

•••

(Emphasis added.) [Transcript, p. 16]
This was confirmed by testimony of Mr Max Forbush, the city manager
for Farmington City:
Mr. Homer: And would you indicate whether
specific stands of quality for those
Mr. Forbush: Yes, it does, it had to pass
Mr. Homer: Okay. And does Farmington City
would inspect this work?
....:.11 - Fun'

or not your ordinance sets
improvements?
inspection.
provide inspectors that

.,_ Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(Emphasis added.) [Transcript, p. 85]
The testimony further indicated that the Appellant, as the developer,
was required by Fannington City to establish an escrow account in the amount
of $269,500.00 to guarantee the installation of these improvements. [Transcript,
p. 86] The evidence also indicated that it was the practice of the parties
that as the various stages in the installation of the improvements were
completed, the Respondent, as contractor, would approach the Appellant,
who would request that the City direct the escrow holder to release to
the Respondent funds for the work he had completed. [Transcript, pp. 86-89]
This arrangement, with the City in the middle and exercising control over the
payment to the contractor [Respondent] worked well until the winter of 1979-1980,
when, as a result of mismanagement and misapplication of funds, by the
developers [Appellant] and their agents, there was no money left in the
escrow account to pay for the work completed by the Respondent. [Transcript,
p. l 08-113]

In May of 1980 the agent of the Appellant tendered to the Respondent
a letter [Exhibit K] directed to Fannington City, requesting that the City
release to the contractor the funds for work he had completed earlier.
When the contractor presented this letter to the escrow holder [American
Savings], he was informed there was no money in the improvement guarantee
account to pay him. [Transcript, pp. 26-28] The letter [Exhibit K] was issued
by the Appellant's agents over six months after the claimed breach of the
contract by the Respondent (contractor) for not completing the contract in
the surmner or early fall of 1979!
It is undisputed that at the time of contracting and perfonnance thereunder,
the Respondent did not have a contractor's license issued by the Utah Department
of Business Regulation. He had obtained his first contractor's license in 1958,
but had allowed it to lapse in 1969. [Transcript, p. 1;:

TAl-"r••&
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until 1980. Thus, the Respondent had been licensed for over ten years. He
testified:
Mr. Homer: .•• Did, during that eleven or ten year period,
the State Department of Business Regulation ever come out
and inspect any of the work you had done?
Mr. George: Not to my knowledge, they never did.
Mr. Homer: What was the extent of the control or the supervision
that the Department of Business regulation exercised over
you during that eleven year period?
Mr. George: None.
Mr. Homer: Following 1969, were you so licensed?
Mr. George: Yes, I reinstated my license in, I think it was June,
1980.
Mr. Homer: Okay. And during the eleven year period from 1969
until you reinstated your license in June of 1980, did you
continue to engage in the work, sewer contractor and water
line contractor?
Mr. George: Yes, sir, I did.
Mr. Homer: Okay. And did you ever have the State come out and
inspect you or close you down or anything like that?
Mr. George: No, sir.
Mr. Homer: And did you have occasion to work for any municipality
during that time, or do work in municipalities for other
subdividers?
Mr. George: I done lots of work in subdivision work, work for
the federal government, which they require no license. I
worked for several of the cities in the county. I suppose
all of the cities in the county, the State of Utah, several
of the government, the federal government, agencies, yes.
Mr. Homer: And did your work pass the inspection by those
municipalities?
Mr. George: Yes, sir, it did.
Mr. Homer: And were those inspections of a similar nature to the
Farmington City inspection you have just described?
Mr. Geor_ge: Yes, sir, they were.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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[Transcript, pp. 18-19]
This lack of any supervision by the Department of Business Regulation
over contractors engaging in "subdivision work 11 was confinned by Mr Walt
Clock, one of the building inspectors for Fannington City. At the time of
trial, he had been a building inspector for almost five and one-half years.
Mr. Homer: ••• And let me go back to these daily inspections,
the ones that you made, did you find Mr. George's perfonnance
to be up to the City standards?
Mr. Clock: Yes, it was meeting the requirements of subdivision
standards.
Mr. Homer: Okay. And you didn't see any problem with the work
he was doing?
Mr. Clock: No.
Mr. Homer: During this time, Mr. Clock, did you ever see any
inspectors from the State Department of Business Regulations
come out?
Mr. Clock: No.
Mr. Homer: To your knowledge as a City Building Inspector, would
agents from that department of Business Regulations come out
and inspect work done within a city by a person doing contracting
work?
Mr. Clock: The only time that I have been involved with it is not
so much on the subdivision development, but in houses. And
occasionally, you know, if they have a problem, they will come
out and inspect. Or in most cases it has been a case where they
had a complaint and they have been out checking for a business
license--! mean contractor's license. And in most cases they
call me when they come in the area, but not always.
Mr. Homer: And would it be safe to say that you would say then that
they would not come out except for a complaint being registered
with that office?
Mr. Clock: Well, I don't know. I am not sure of their exact
procedure. But in my dealings with then they have been there
generally on a complaint. But this has been about three different
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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times. But again, it had to do with the building and not
with subdivision development; that was house building.
Mr. Homer: To your knowledge has an agent from the Department of
Business Regulations, the Contracting Division, ever come out
and inspected a subdivision within Farmington City?
Mr. Clock: Not to my knowledge.
[Transcript, pp. 92-93.]
ARGUMENT
I

UTAH LAW DOES NOT ABSOLUTELY BAR
AN UNLICENSED CONTRACTOR FROM
ENFORCING HIS CONTRACT WHERE THERE
ARE ADEQUATE PROTECTIONS AND TO
DENY ENFORCEABILITY WOULD OPERATE
AS AN UNREASONABLE FORFEITURE
Appellant has cited some older Utah cases [Smith vs American Packing

& Provision Co., 102 Utah 351, 130 P.2d 951 (1942); Olsen vs Reese, 114
Utah 411, 220 P.2d 733 (1948); Mosley vs Johnson, 22 Utah 2d 348, 453 P.2d
149 (1969); and Meridian Corporation vs McGlynn/Garmaker Co., 567 P.2d
1110 (Utah 1977)], interpretting Section 58-23-18 (and its predecessor)
as barring an unlicensed contractor from recovery. However, Appellant
glosses over those more-recent Utah cases which obviously apply to the
instant situation and which ought to be controlling.
In the case of Lignell vs Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah 1979), the Utah
Supreme Court wrote:
The evidence clearly shows, at the times of BBC's execution
and performance of the contract at issue, BBC was not licensed
to engage in the business of contractor. It acted -:rr;-that capacity,
therefore, in violation of 58-23-1. Consequently, argue the Owners,
BBC is without status to enforce the contract or resort to the
courts on any theory to obtain recompense for its work.
This Court has had frequent occasion to comment on the
status of unlicensed contractors, and has persistently construed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the cited statute as having been designed to protect the public
and consequently to bar recovery by unlicensed contractors for
services rendered under their contracts. The most recent Utah
cases so holding are Mosley v Johnson and Mer~dian Corp. v McGlYnn
Garmaker Company [citations omitted]. The rationale of those
cases is, however, that the party from whom the contractor seeks
to recover is in the class the legislature intended to protect.
A litigant _ll not~ member of that class if t~e regu~red pro~ection
Ti.e. against inept and financially irresponsible builders) .!§..
in fact afforded _Ql another means.
.
In Fillmore Products v Western States Paving, Utah, 561 P.2d
687, we adopted the point of view expressed by Professor Corbin,
viz., 11 the general rule" (of nonenforceability) is not to be
applied mechanically but in a manner "pennitting the court to
consider the merits of the particular case and to avoid unreasonable
penalties and forfeitures."
In this case, the denial of recovery to BBC would indeed
impose unreasonable penalties and forfeitures, particularly
because the Owners were never deprived of the kind of protection
the licensing statute was designed to afford.
593 P.2d at 804-805. (Emphasis added. Footnotes omitted.)
The legal approach advocated by the Appellant "mechanically applies"
the rule; that approach likewises denies the co_urt__ the opportunity to
''consider the merits of the particular case and to avoid unreasonable
penalties and forefeitures." Id.
In the instant situation, the Appellant had the "required protection

..

• afforded by another means" (i.e. the inspections by Fannington City).

Similarly, the denial of recovery to the Respondent would "indeed impose
unreasonable penalties and forfeitures" upon him.
Appellant, on page 10 of its brief, attempts to distinguish Fillmore
Products from the instant case by noting that the Respondent here was not
acting as a subcontractor to a general contractor and that the project was
not under the control or direction of a project engineer. This approach
is obviously more concerned with 11 form 11 than with the real "substance" of
the situation. In Fillmore Products, the Court noted:
. . . In this case it is clear than an unlicensed contractor
is dealing with a licensed general or original contractor. And the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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defendants have not disputed that the entire sewer project was
under the supervision of a licensed project engineer, that all
of the work had to meet the specifications and requirements of
the general contract and that all of the work had to be approved
and accepted _Qy the project engineer before ~ payment was made
_Qy the Town of Ferron.
561 P.2d at 690. (Emphasis added.) In this situation, the parties did not
have a "project engineer" to oversee the work; they had the Farmington
City building inspector. They didn't have an overall general contract,
whose standards had to be met; they had the requirements of the Farmington
City subdivision ordinance.
Justice Wilkins, speaking for a unanimous Court in Fillmore Products,
continued:
The parties should be able to present their positions to
the court because under the facts of this case---which are
undisputed concerning whether the general rule supra ought to
be applied---the law intended for protecting the public might
become "an unwarranted shield for the avofdance of a just
obligation."
Id. (Citation in footnote omitted.) The trial court judge did not err by
allowing the case to be presented .. He likewise did not err in refusing to
grant Appellant's motion for judgment n.o.v. From his advantaged position
of having conducted the two-day jury trial and heard the same arguments
on two separate occasions, he wrote:
The Court concludes that this case falls within the doctrine
enunciated in the Fillmore Products, Inc. v. Western States Paving,
Inc., 561 P. 2nd 687, i.e., there is a substantial penalty or
forfeiture involved if plaintiff is denied recovery; there was
never any question that plaintiff was entitled to be 1icensed, in
that he was licensed before and immediately after the subject
contract; he was known by the general partner of defendant prior
to contracting; and defendant was _adequately protected _Qy reason
of the fact that the project had to be tested and approved _Qy
the Farmington City Engineer.
•

•

•

Memorandum Decision of Judge Calvin Gould, dated March 12, 1982. [The complete
text of his opinion is included as an Appendix to this brief.] (Emphasis added.)
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II
THE PENALTIES ASSOCIATED WITH
ENGAGING IN CONTRACTING WITHOUT
A STATE LICENSE OUGHT TO BE
STRICTLY CONSTRUED AND LIMITED
TO THEIR EXPRESS TERMS
Section 58-23-18 of the Utah Code Annotated provides that engaging
in the business of a contractor without having first procured the appropriate
license therefor is a "misdemeanor". There was no evidence presented to
show that the Respondent was ever prosecuted, let alone convicted, of
this criminal offense for his acts arising in the instant transaction.
The decision to prosecute is for the appropriate regulatory and prosecutorial
authorities, not the Appellant, to make. The Respondent, uncharged and
certainly unconvicted, is entitled to the "presumption of innocence" until
proven guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt." By applying the older Utah case
law while disregarding the two case doctrines of less than five years, the
Appellant is advocating a penalty (i.e. the "loss ... to the Respondent of
over $60,000) be assessed in an amount almost TWO HUNDRED TIMES that
prescribed by law for a class B misdemeanor!
On this particular point, Justice Crockett, in the Mosley decision,
supra, wrote:
One of the most elementary principles· of justice is that
where one contracts for goods or services from another he must
pay for them. It is appreciated that there are some exceptions
where the law does not so require. But it is so squarely contrary
to basic concepts of justice to deny compensation to one who has
rendered service, and to give an unearned benefit to the recipient
of the service, that this is done only when cogent and persuasive
considerations of public policy render the result necessary.
This is usally where there is involved the commission of a crime
or the doing of something wherein there is such a hazard to
health, safety or morals, that it is deemed that the harm to
result from enforcement of such a contract outweights the injustice
of not enforcing it. In my opinion there is nothing shown in this
case from which it can reasonably be concluded that the drilling
of a well without a pennit has any such vital relationship or
hazards public health, welfare or morals, as to impose the penalty
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of denying plaintiff pay for his work and to unjustly enrich the
undeserving defendants.
453 P.2d at 152-153.
Along this same theme, Justice Wilkins, writing for the majority in
Fillmore Products, wrote:
Although many courts yearn for a mechanically applicable
rule, they have not made one in the present instance. Justice
requires that the penalty should fit the crime; and justice
and sound policy do not always require the enforcement of
licensing statutes by large forfeitures going not to the state
but repudiating defendants.
561 P.2d at 689.
This is exactly on point with the instant situation. The parties
themselves were not concerned that the Department of Business Regulation
[the licensing agency for contractors] would have any immediate concerns
in the project undertaken by the Respondent. All inspections and supervision
would be effected by the agents of Farmington City. Prior to the execution
of the contract, both parties understood this simple principle: if the
Respondent did not· satisfy Farmington City, he would not be paid! The
"protection of the public" was accomplished---not by compliance with the
state licensing statute---but rather by the satisfactory completion of the
work according to Farmington City specifications.
Article I, Section 18 of the Utah Constitution provides, in part:
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing
the obligations of contracts shall be passed.
(Emphasis added.) This provision patterns the United States Constitution,
which provides:
No state shall . . . pass any bill of attainder, ex post
facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts.
Article 1, Section 10. (Emphasis added.)
It is the function of the judiciary to interpret the statutes passed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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by the Legislature. The cases cited by the Appellant [Smith, Meridian~ Olsen
and Mosley], which construe the Utah contractors licensing statutes as
rendering unenforceable those contracts made by an unlicensed contractor,
were not decided upon this constitutional basis. Thus, it is proper for the
Court to reconsider the holdings of those cases.
It is fundamental to our system of jurisprudence that the Constitutions
(state and national) be called into question as infrequently as possible. One
tenet of that basic principle is that statutes enacted by the Legislature
ought to be presumed to be constitutional and, when called into constitutional
question, ought to be given a construction which does not raise issues as to
the constitutionality of the statute. The four cases cited above raise such
constitutional issues. It ought to be obvious that the Legislature itself
could not pass legis_lation directly "impairing the obligation of contracts. 11
The fact that the effect thereof is first passed through a judicial decision
does not cure the constitutional invalidity. The statute says and means what
this Court says it means. This Court ought to give the statute a narrow
interpretation so as to avoid the constitutional issue.
The licensing statute ought to be construed consistently with its
expressed terms, rather than being given an expanded construction. Under
Utah law, a 11 forfeiture 11 is not favored. In interpreting an agreement,
"every reasonable presumption should be indulged against an intention to
allow a forfeiture." Green vs Palfreyman, 166 P.2d 215 at 219 (Utah 1946).
This ought to be the same standard to be applied against interpreting a
statute. Indeed, in the case of Morgan vs Sorenson, 3 Utah 2d 428, 286
P.2d 229 (1955), this Court indulged in a liberal interpretation of the
suspension statute (as had been used for construing assessment work for
mining claims), so as to avoid a forfeiture, which the Court

char~rt~~i?cn
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as "odious to the law." Id. at 231. The Respondent is not asking the Court
to construe the licensing statute "liberally," so as to avoid a forfeiture;
rather, Respondent seeks a "narrow" construction (to its expressed terms) so
as to avoid the severe penalties associated with the Olsen decision and
its progeny.
In Russell vs Park City Utah Corporation, 548 P.2d 889 (Utah 1976), this
Court wrote:
It is true, as defendant argues, that forfeitures are not
favored in the law, and that forfeiture provisions will be strictly
construed against the one who seeks to enforce them. But it is also
true that parties are free to contract according to their desires
in whatever terms they can agree upon; and further, that the
contract should be enforced according to its terms, unless-that
result is so unconscionable that~ court of equity will refuse
to enforce it.
Id. at 891. (Emphasis added.) That's all the Respondent seeks: to strictly
construe the statutory language effecting the forfeiture and to allow
enforcement of the contract the parti.es agreed ··.to!
One merely read Section 58-23-18 to discern that there is no language
which imposes such a forfeiture upon the contractor similar to the Respondent.
On Page 9 of its brief, the Appellant cites American Jurisprudence,
Second. To illustrate, I will quote the portion of that paragraph which
is pertinent to this discussion:
Under a statute providing that ~ contractor cannot maintain
an action unless he alleges and proves that he was duly licensed
at all times during the performance of the contract or when his
cause of action arose, it is commonly held that he cannot recover

...

51 Am. Jur. 2d, Licenses and Permits, Section 65. (Emphasis added.)

Section 58-23-18 says nothing about the ability of a contractor to
"maintain an action." It merely specifies that he is guilty of a 11 misdemeanor. 11
Justice Crockett, again writing in Mosley, supra, noted:
Where the resolution of such a question is based upon a
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statute, it is to that statute that we should look to detennine
whatever penalty and/or sanction was intended for its violati~n •.
In this instance the statute simply provides that a person dr1ll1ng
a we 11 i_ s gu_i 1ty of a misdemeanor and subject to fine or imprisonment,
but proyides no other sanction or disability~ .!! is important to ke~p
in mind that where our legislature has int~n~ed.that.the~e be sanctions
or limitations for the failure to comply with! statute n has
expressly so prOVldecI:453 P.2d at 153. (Emphasis added.)
In 1981, the Legislature adopted Section 58A-1-26. That statute is
absolutely clear that no unlicensed contractor can "conmence or maintain
any action in any court of the state for collection of compensation ••. "
This statute was not in effect at times material to this lawsuit; the Appellant
even concedes such. It is cited here, however, to show the ease with which the
Legislature could have expressed itself to accomplish the desired result.
The 1981 expression of the legislative will does not show a "philosophical
legislative intent" as Appellant claims (p. 13 of his brief); rather, it is
an admission that the Legislature itself was uncomfortable with the fonner
language.
Finally, as a matter of equity, the contract should be enforced. The
contract proposal was submitted by the Respondent to the Appellant in May
of 1979. Approximately two or three weeks later, the proposal was returned
to the Respondent. It had been executed by the Appellant's agents. [Transcript,
pp. 9-10. This particular point---exactly when the contract proposals were
presented and an representations concerning a "completion date" were disputed.
Appellant claimed the meeting occurred in the early spring and that a late
summer or early fall completion date was promised by the Respondent. This
issue was presented to the jury under the Appellant's theory that it was
the Respondent who breached the contract by failing to complete the contract
on time. In light of the jury verdict upon special interrogatories, which
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expressly found in Respondent's favor, the "facts" must be that the meeting
occurred in May 1979.] That two- or three-week period should have been adequate
for the Appellant to ascertain the license status of the contractor. It would
have been a matter of public record! The Appellant chose not to even invest
one dime for a phone call to the Business Regulation Department. In the
brief of the Appellant, Mr. Kaplan and Mr Sullivan are characterized as
"babes in the woods" with respect to this transaction. Yet they were about
to invest $400,000 in the project. Similarly, Mr Kaplan testified quite
extensively [Transcript, pp. 205, 208-210] concerning his experience with
many other contractors, even in foreign countries.
In a similar vein, the Appellant has consistently acted as though there
were an enforceable contract. [As noted earlier, no "affirmative defense"
was pleaded.] On the contrary, their position was that there was.a contract
and that the contract was enforceable by them so as to support a counter-claim
worth several hundred thousand dollars of injury caused by the Respondent's
alleged breach. The Appellant persisted in that approach until---on the eve
of trial---it saw it could not prevail and sought then to avoid its obligations
altogether. It just isn't right that the Appellant can have a benefit conferred
upon it and then be allowed to rescind its obligation to pay for that benefit
on the basis of a slight technicality which was not of concern to the parties
at the time of contracting. The Appellant exercised its right to present to
the jury the issues it wanted: that it was harmed by the unprofessional
(i.e. untimely) performance of the Respondent. The jury verdict saw that for
what it really was: a ruse to avoid the just obligations it had voluntarily
incurred.
The Appellant had a fair trial. Justice requires that the jury verdict
be affirmed and that Respondent be allowed his recovery.
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CONCLUSION
Under the pertinent case law, the licensing statute is not to be
"mechanically applied so as to bar an unlicensed contractor from recovery.
11

Rather, the court is to "consider the merits of the particular case and
to avoid unreasonable penalties and forfeitures." That happened in this
case. The case was fully prepared and presented to a jury; the jury found
in favor of the Respondent. The trial judge expressly found that to bar
Respondent's recovery on the basis of his unlicensed status would operate
as a "substantial penalty or forfeiture." There was adequate other "protection"
for the developers (in the fonn of the Fannington City inspections).
Equity and the rules of statutory construction require a narrow
construction of the statute so as to avoid a farielt.ur:e and to avoid constitutional
issues. Equity and justice require that the law be decided.so as to not work
a "penalty or forfeiture 11 upon the contractor, while allowing a windfall
to the .undeserving subdivision owner whose land has been significantly
benefited.
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of August, 1982.

CERTIFICATE
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
to Mr Lorin N Pace, 1200 Beneficial Life Tower, 36 So. State Street, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111, this 13th day of August, 1982.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FRANK R. GEORGE, d/b/a Frank
George & Son Construction,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)

vs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Civil No. 1-28371

)

OREN LIMITED & ASSOCIATES,
a Utah limited partnership,
Defendant.

)
)
)

The Court concludes that this case falls within the
doctrine enunciated in the Fillmore Products, Inc. v. Western
States Paving, Inc., 561 P. 2nd 687, i.e.,

there is a substantial

penalty or forfeiture involved if plaintiff is denied recovery;
there was never any question that plaintiff was entitled to be
licensed, in that he was licensed before and immediately after the
subject contract; he was known by the general partner of defendant
prior to contracting; and defendant was adequately protected by
reason of the fact that the project had to be tested and approved
by the Farmington City Engineer.
Defendant's Motion for Judgment N.O.V. is accordingly
denied, and Judgment pursuant to Verdict on Special Interrogatories
.is to be entered in the form of Exhibit "A" attached hereto.
DATED this

I

/,2t(day of March, 1982.
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